McGovern/Polk Out of Iraq

George McGovern and William R. Polk

Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now

Simon and Schuster. 2006

Reviewed by Gladys Foster, February 27, 2007

This book outlines the best plan I have seen for getting out of Iraq, best in part because it advises getting out now, beginning in 2006, that is (unfortunately, we're already past that date), and finishing by the end of June 2007, in part because it gives explicit advice about how to help Iraq, and also because the authors tell us a lot about the history of Iraq that we should understand and about what the U.S. is planning.

George McGovern served in the U.S. House of Representatives four years and the Senate eighteen years and then was a candidate for President. He is the recipient of numerous awards including the Distinguished Flying Cross for service as a bomber pilot in World War II. He holds a Ph.D. from Northwestern University and has been a visiting professor at fifteen American and European Universities and has spoken at nearly two thousand college campuses all over the world.

William R. Polk studied at Harvard and Oxford and taught at Harvard until he was appointed to be a member of the State Department Planning Council for the Middle East in 1961. He has been professor of history at the University of Chicago and founded its Middle East Studies Center. He has also been president of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs and has authored a number of books on international relations.

The following is what they have to tell us:

The U.S. is building at least four large remote bases in Iraq, which suggests a permanent occupation, and is making the Green Zone in Baghdad into a small city with 300 houses, barracks, etc., and its own electrical, water, and sewage systems. Eight out of ten Iraqis regard us as occupiers, and 88 percent of the Sunni Muslim Arabs favor violent attacks on American troops.

Both the British and the Americans have believed that native troops would be less unpopular than foreign troops, which is dubious when natives are perceived to be puppets, with the result that the insurgents often regard them as quislings, and Iraqi troops refuse to fight, or join the insurgents. Almost certainly the troops have attitudes that no training is likely to alter while foreigners remain in Iraq.

From the British control of Iraq to the present, Iraq has lurched from one military dictatorship to another without a chance to form coherent institutions or even the accustomed habits of civil society. Iraq became independent by treaty with Britain in 1922, then by recognition of the League of Nations in 1932. Britain reoccupied Iraq in WWII and ruled until 1958. After assurance that the U.S. would not object to an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. did indeed invade in 1991, and again in 2003, and Iraq was burdened by severe sanctions, which resulted in many children being stunted. Many Iraqis would probably say today they would like to return to Saddam's 1970s and 198s policy of modernization.

Oil for more than a century has been both a blessing and a curse for Iraq, with complex arrangements with Britain, France, Turkey, and America. Oil production now has fallen from 2.5 million barrels a day to around 1.1 million. The American answer was to bring in British and American oil companies, suggesting that the Iraq invasion was about oil.

As for getting out, the U.S. cannot impose its will on Iraq, however badly they resume their lives. We have to let them do it their way. Self-determination is a fundamental right. Reconstituting our good name will require blending political, moral, and financial remedies. We won't be able to prevent turmoil, but withdrawal will remove a major cause of insurgency. The phased withdrawal we outline below is not "cut and run."

Steps for Withdrawal:

• The first way the U.S. can be helpful is to contribute to a “bridging” effort between the occupation and complete independence. The Iraqi government would be wise to request the short-term services of an international force to police the country during and immediately after the period of withdrawal, with a firm date fixed for withdrawal--about two years. The insurgency will thus lose support and power. Iraq could use the UN and/or the Arab League, and get Arabs as much as possible, say, 3000 each from Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt, or maybe Jordan and Syria, or Pakistan, Malaysia, and/or Indonesia. The U.S. should pay for this--about $6 billion, or about 2 percent of what continued war would cost. This should be paid to the Iraqi government, which would then ”hire” the services of the forces on a government-to-government basis. The U.S. should also turn over equipment that is suitable, particularly transport, communications, and light arms.
• During the period of withdrawal the U.S. should provide assistance in every way possible to train a permanent national police force comprised of Iraqi citizens to replace the international force. The Iraqi government is unlikely to want to continue supporting insurgents, so the level of combat is almost certain to be reduced. Creating a national police force is proving very difficult, however, because of the bitterness caused by the occupation, so this may take from 4 to 5 years. The U.S. should provide about $1 billion to help the Iraqi government to create, train, and equip such a force. This is roughly the cost of about 4 days of the American occupation.
• America should immediately release all prisoners of war and close its detention centers.
• The U.S. should not encourage the Iraqis to maintain an army but instead might encourage transferring the military to a national police force or to a national reconstruction corps modeled on the U.S. Corps of Engineers, to undertake the rebuilding of infrastructure damaged by the war. The U.S. could allocate $5 million to this, or roughly the cost of 2 days of the occupation.
• The U.S. should stop immediately work on the 4 bases we’re building there and turn them over to Iraq. We are told that 14 “enduring bases,” amounting to virtual cities for American troops are also under construction; they should be closed.
• Americans should withdraw from the Green Zone and turn it over to Iraq no later than December 31, 2007.
• Before the turnover the U.S should buy, rent, or build a “normal” embassy, not in the Green Zone, with a much reduced complement of U.S. officials.
• The U.S. should stop paying the at least 25,000 mercenaries (known euphemistically as Personal Security Detail)--literally the “loose cannons” of the Iraq war.
• The U.S. must dig up and destroy land mines and unexploded ordinance and clean up depleted uranium in artillery shells and their targets. As much as possible of this work should be turned over to Iranian contractors and labor. Unemployment in Iraq is very high, in the millions. This might cost $250 million--roughly one day’s wartime expenditure.
• Property damage from the invasion and occupation is estimated at between $100 billion and $200 billion. The U.S. should employ grants and loans and employ Iraqis, especially the “grassroots,” as much as possible, for reconstruction. We suggest that the U.S. allocate $1 billion for surveys, planning, and organization before trying to determine how much to provide for reconstruction. We urge generosity.
• Work should be undertaken to dismantle and dispose of the miles of concrete blast walls and wire barriers, at, say $500 m.
• Some American facilities have done enormous damage to Iraqi cultural sites, e.g., the Babylon World Heritage archeological site and the 5000-year-old site of Kish. America should set up a fund of, say, $250 million to be administered by a committee drawn from the Iraqi Museum of Antiquities, the British Museum, the Smithsonian Institute, the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, and other organizations to assist in the restoration of damaged sites.
• Independent accounting of Iraqi funds is urgently required. The UN handed over billions of dollars generated by the sale of Iraq petroleum to the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority), on the understanding that the monies would be used for the benefit of the Iraqi people, and this has gone unaccounted for. An independent audit should be undertaken immediately, for, say, $100 million. The U.S. is morally obligated to repay any misused or misappropriated funds. Perhaps the most damaging is the $2.4 billion for a project allocated to Halliburton’s subsidiary Kellogg, Brown, and Root. During 2004 the U.S. Army paid the company or its subsidiaries more than $7 billion and is expected to pay out $4-5 billion in 2006.
• The U.S. should make reparations to Iraqi civilians for loss of lives and property it caused. Individual military units are authorized to make “condolence payments” of up to $2,500. The numbers of civilians killed or wounded is unknown, but present estimates suggest a cost of $200 million.
• To assist in the growth of civic institutions the U.S. should offer, through suitable international, multinational, or nongovernmental organizations, a number of financial inducements and supports. These should include fellowships for the training of lawyers, judges, journalists, social workers and other civic affairs workers, at Iraq, European, Asian, or American educational institutions, at a cost of, say, $500 million to promote it.
• Assistance to grassroots organizations and professional societies could help to encourage the return to Iraq of the thousands of skilled men and women who left the country in the years following the 1991 Gulf War, for a total cost of $500 million.
• Payments should be made to those tortured, as defined by the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and to those who have suffered long-term imprisonment. We have not been able to assess the cost.
• The U.S. should not object to the Iraqi government voiding all oil contracts for petroleum exploration, development, and marketing made during the American occupation, so that these can be renegotiated. Iraqi oil has been sold at a discount to Americans. We expect no cost for this.
• The U.S. should encourage with large-scale assistance various UN agencies as well as nongovernmental organizations to help reconstitute the Iraqi public health system through the rebuilding of hospitals and clinics and the purchase of diagnostic and therapeutic equipment, plus training for health workers at a cost of $500 million for the first year, $400 million for the second, $300 million for the third, $200 million for the fourth, and $100 million for the final year of the program, for a final total of about $1.7 billion, which is less than the cost of about 8 days of occupation.
• Finally, America should express its condolences for the large number of Iraqis killed, incapacitated, incarcerated, and/or tortured. No monetary cost.

The total cost of the programs outlined above is about $7.75 billion for the basic program, plus about $5.5 billion for the second tier. They would save us at least $350 billion and more likely $400-$500 billion (2 years of occupation). Even if our estimates are low, we believe it would be one of the best investments we ever made.

The U.S. veterans of the Iraq war deserve a comprehensive rehabilitation--physically, mentally, educationally, and economically, including the highly successful offerings of the WWII GI Bill of Rights. We need to bind up the nation’s wounds.

What about the war on terrorism? Two facts to put this in perspective: Since the late 1960s, the number of Americans killed by international terrorists is about the same as that killed by lightning. And the U.S. occupation in Iraq helps to recruit terrorists.

Washington is planning new Vietnams and Iraqs and the construction of scores of bases in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, from which to launch new campaigns. Reading the National Security Policy suggests not the beacon of hope but the knell of doom. Neocons in Washington are planning perpetual war. Thus other countries want nuclear weapons to deter the U.S. Real security cannot be secured in this direction. Only mutual restraint is the answer.

McGovern/Polk Out of Iraq

George McGovern